Abstract. Many debates in arenas such as bioethics turn on questions regarding the moral status of human beings at various stages of biological development or decline. It is often argued that a human being possesses a fundamental and inviolable moral status insofar as she is a "person"; yet, it is contested whether all or only human beings count as persons. Perhaps there are non-human persons, and perhaps not every human being satisfies the definitional criteria for being a person. A further question, which will be the primary focus of this paper, concerns what essential features of personhood endow persons, human or otherwise, with their moral status and the inherent rights they concomitantly possess. A survey of the history of philosophical theorizing on what it means to be a person yields a broad consensus upon the key capacities being rational thought, self-consciousness, and autonomous volition. It is not sufficient, however, simply to cite these capacities, but to explain why these particular capacities bear moral import. A more recent concern has developed regarding the possible future existence of so-called "post-persons" who, due to their enhanced cognitive and emotive capacities, may be morally superior to mere persons and thereby possess a higher moral status. This paper will conclude with an analysis of the extent to which this concern is warranted.
Introduction -The Foundation of Human Rights
Nearly seventy year ago, in the wake of the extreme dehumanization and mass murder that occurred during the Holocaust, political leaders and international lawyers began to invoke the concept of inalienable "human rights," such as are enshrined in the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
1 While the recognition of such rights and their use in prosecuting "crimes against humanity" has been undoubtedly an advancement in international law, there is a significant underlying question concerning the philosophical foundation for such rights-in terms of both their very existence and the enumeration of these specific rights. At the time the U.N.
Declaration was drafted, a "philosophical committee"-officially titled the Committee on the Theoretical Bases of Human Rights-was established to advise the drafting committee on just what theoretical foundations, whether secular or religiously-based, ground the existence of these recognized rights.
This committee, and others from whom input was solicited, comprised representatives of various, sometimes inherently contentious, philosophical schools, religious traditions, and political systems-from Mohandas Gandhi to Aldous Huxley. The committee was chaired by the Thomistic philosopher Jacques Maritain. When a visitor observing the committee at work showed amazement that representatives from such disparate schools of thought and belief could agree on a list of universal rights, Maritain quipped, "Yes, we agree about the rights but on condition no one asks us why" (Glendon 2001, 77; cf. UNESCO 1949, 9) . 2 Maritain's own answer to the foundation for such rights was, of course, Thomistic natural law theory:
In my opinion any rational justification of the idea of the rights of man, as of the idea of law in general, demands that we should rediscover the idea of natural law … in its true metaphysical connotations, its realistic dynamism and the humility of its relation with nature and experience. We are then able to understand how a certain ideal order, rooted in the nature of man and of human 1 http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/. Accessed 10/10/16.
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For an analysis of the "value generalization" that occurred during the framing of the Declaration, see Joas 2013, ch. 6. society, can impose moral demands valid throughout the world of experience, history and fact, and can establish, for the conscience as for the written law, the permanent principle and the elementary and universal criteria of rights and duties (Maritain 1947) . Maritain (2001, 78) further contends, "The same natural law which lays down our most fundamental duties, and by virtue of which every law is binding, is the very law which assigns to us our fundamental rights." While the concept of "rights" was foreign to St. Thomas Aquinas in the 13th century, his natural law ethic, informed by his philosophical anthropology, provides a sound and universally applicable-if not universally acknowledged-foundation for the human rights that nations around the globe ought to strive to implement in their civil laws. 
Establishing the Central Question
In this paper, I explore a meta-level question that undergirds Maritain' Declaration of Independence, asserted that, at the metaphysical level, human beings are "endowed by their Creator" with such rights; and, at the epistemic level, the existence of such rights was "self-evident." Interestingly, as a deist who did not necessarily believe in a "personal" God, Jefferson may have meant that our possession of such rights was simply given by virtue of our nature qua human, as opposed to having been granted to us intentionally by divine fiat (Holmes 2006) . Furthermore, their self-evident existence means that they ought to be recognized epistemically by even non-theists-the U.N. While membership in the species Homo sapiens is sufficient for full moral worth, it is not in any direct sense the criterion for moral worth. If we discovered an extra-terrestrial being of a rational nature, or learned that some terrestrial species have a rational nature, then we would owe such beings full moral respect (Lee and George 2008, 176; cf. Beckwith 2007, 161-2) .
One way of terminologically resolving this issue is simply to label all alien life-forms who exhibit certain relevant traits sufficiently similar to us as "human"; but the descriptor "human" may be too well-grounded in reference to the biological species Homo sapiens. Given, for example, recent research into the creation of chimeras, in which human DNA is engrafted into non-human animal embryos via stem-cell transplant, there is at least a conceivable possibility that, say, a primate embryo into which human neural stem cells have been engrafted could develop into a mature animal that thinks, feels, and autonomously wills just as we do (Eberl and Ballard 4 Kittay (2005, 124) , e.g., argues that "membership in a group of moral peers based solely on species membership has as its appropriate moral analogue family membership, not racism and not pernicious nationalism. As humans we are indeed a family."
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A recent study indicates that the universe may contain 10x the number of currently observable galaxies (Conselice et al. 2016) . Aquinas (1948, Ia, q. 29, a. 4 ad 4) refers to the members of the Trinity, angels, and human beings all as persons. The term "person," however, is not applied univocally to these three distinct types of beings. For example, God the Father is not an "individual substance," but is an "incommunicable being or subsistence" (1948, Ia, q. 29, a. 3 ad 4, a. 4; q. 30, a. 4 ). An angel does not have a "rational nature," which implies knowledge by discursive reasoning, but is an "intellectual being" by having the capacity to know without discursion (1948, Ia, q. 58, a. 3) . Due to such differences in nature, "person" cannot be the proper substance concept for the members of the Trinity, angels, or human beings. Nevertheless, God the Father's existence as an incommunicable subsistence is analogous to a human being's existence as an individual substance; and an angel's intellective nature is analogous to a human being's rational nature. Thus, the term "person" is properly ascribed to the members of the Trinity, angels, and human beings, but not without qualification, and hence not as a substance concept. For his detailed description of the members of the Trinity as a persons, see Aquinas, 1948, Ia, qq. 29-30 . For his account of angelic nature as distinct from human nature, see Aquinas, 1948, Ia, q. 50 , aa. 1-2.
Defining Personhood
The concept of "personhood" has a long philosophical history. The word is derived from the Greek term prosopon, referring to the masks worn by stage actors to depict different characters they were portraying. A variant of this term is still used today when referring to someone taking on or displaying a certain persona-i.e., an inauthentic self. The Latin term persona originally, however, referred to someone possessing legal status within the Roman Empire. The concept of "legal personhood" is still utilized today as U.S. law, for example, recognizes the existence of incorporated businesses as such; whereas unborn human fetuses do not enjoy this legal status. One of the earliest and most oft-cited uses of persona in a philosophical sense is in a 6 th -century treatise by Boethius (1918) When Aquinas considers whether the term "person" is rightly ascribed to the members of the Holy Trinity, he answers that it is so because it is a term of dignity: "Person signifies that which is most perfect in all of nature, namely, subsistence in a rational nature" (Aquinas 1948, Ia, q. 29, a. 3.) . See also Aquinas (1948, Ia, q. 29, a. 3 ad 2), where he refers to persons being distinct by reason of dignity.
of their free wills (Aquinas 1948, Ia, q. 59, a. 3) . As with angels, human beings possess freedom of will due to our intellective capacity (Aquinas 1948, Ia, q. 83, a. 1), which in turn entails that each of us exists first and foremost for our own sake-not as instruments to be used for some other end (Aquinas 1975, bk. III, ch. 112) . Relatedly, Aquinas contends that, while each of us is undeniably a member of a larger society of persons, each of us "is a kind of whole unto himself, with rights and duties transcending his membership in the body politic" (McLaughlin 1985, 169-70; see Aquinas 1948, Ia-IIae, q. 21, a. 4 ad 3). Non-human animals, however, though sentient and capable of self-movement, do not possess a will that is free, but rather appetites driven by natural necessity and thus do not count as persons-at least as far as Aquinas knew (Aquinas 1948, Ia, q. 81, a. 3).
In sum, human beings qua persons have an essentially rational nature, the definitive capacity of which is for intellective thought, by virtue of which human beings are capable of understanding the universal essences of things and otherwise knowing truth that transcends material reality (Aquinas 1948, Ia, q. 79 ; see also Eberl 2004)-culminating in our capacity to receive divine grace by which we may come to understand the source of our being: God.
Concomitant with this epistemic capacity is the capacity to appetitively orient oneself towards, or away from, what is constitutive of, or detracts from, human flourishing. Human beings have free will due to our ability to choose among various goods we may perceive and assess as appropriate means to attaining our ultimate end understood both naturally-i.e., flourishing in accord with our rational nature-and supernaturally-i.e., loving union with God (Aquinas 1948, Ia-IIae, qq. 1-5) . These inherent capacities, grounded in human beings' essential nature, and our relation to our Creator is what grounds the inherent dignity of each individual human being as a person in possession of herself, such that she may not be considered merely as an insignificant member of a larger political whole.
Later philosophical developments concerning the concept of personhood have continued to focus on a set of relatively similar traits, all of which can be traced back causally to our existence as "rational" beings. In the 17 th century, John Locke (1975, 335 ) defined a person as "a thinking intelligent self-reflexive consciousness, using language to communicate, having non-momentary self-interests, and possessing moral agency or autonomy (Singer 1992; Kuhse and Singer 1985; Tooley 1983; Warren 1973) . Some of these latter-day theorists consider it essential to being a person that one is actually engaging in these activities, or could at least immediately do so without any intrinsic impediment. I have argued elsewhere, however, that it is sufficient for being a person if one possesses the intrinsic active potentiality to engage in these activities, the actualization of which may require development over time-as in the case of human embryos or fetuses (Eberl 2014) . I have also previously argued that such potentialities may persist even if the material foundation to immediately exercise some of them has been irreversibly damaged-as in the case of those in a persistent vegetative state (Eberl 2005) .
Collating all of these historical and contemporary views, I propose as a summative thesis that a "person" is any being who possesses by virtue of their essential nature an intrinsic active potentiality for self-conscious rational thought 9 and autonomous volition, and who is thereby a member of the moral community. While this general definition captures the essence of being a person, it omits many nuances that are often contested. For example, it is debated whether having an active potentiality for self-conscious rational thought and autonomous volition requires having a biological cerebrum, or whether a functionally equivalent silicon information-processing system would suffice. Also debated is what is required to be a member of the moral community. For example, a severely cognitively disabled human being may not be a contributing member of the moral community-in that she does not have the mental capacity to fulfill duties to others-but may be a recipient member-in that she has rights which entail others fulfilling duties toward her. If a non-human animal, a human-nonhuman chimera, or an extraterrestrial alien were found to possess the above-mentioned traits, they would arguably count as a person. Perhaps even, though this may be impossible in principle, if an artificially intelligent machine were to be engineered with such traits-and not the mere simulacrum of them-it too would count as a person. Yet, we still have not directly answered our central question.
Personhood and Moral Status
Consider a paradigmatic, uncontroverted case of personhood: viz., a cognitively normal, mature human being. This being possesses, among other traits, the putatively morally-relevant traits of self-consciousness, intellective and practical-in the sense of moral, not merely technical-reasoning, and autonomy. But why do these traits give this being her elevated moral status above non-persons? One response is that these traits are self-recognized as belonging to the only species, on this planet at least, that has the capacity to assert its own moral status; in short, the moral value of the traits definitive of persons is due to their being traits definitive of humans (Kadlac 2010) .
While this response avoids the pejorative "speciesism" charge, insofar as it 9 "Rational thought" is here understood in the Thomistic sense of intellection as described above.
J A S O N T. E B E R L
extends the recognition of such traits and consequent moral status potentially to non-human persons, it remains anthropocentric in origin, which is perhaps all we can do epistemically with no other species of persons in the known universe to serve as a comparator.
It is arguable that a person possesses the moral status she does by virtue of her capacity to have significant interests, the frustration of which would cause her to experience a degree of harm beyond the pain that merely sentient non-personal animals may experience-which is by no means to deny that such animals have interests as well that merit respect to the extent that doing so does not precipitate significant harm, or loss of morally significant benefits, to persons (Barad 1988; Drum 1992; Tardiff 1998; Camosy 2013 ). This claim would seem to take us beyond Aquinas's conclusion that the dignity of persons is due to their capacity for mastery over their own actions; for such mastery may be exercised for good or for evil, and perhaps we should not respect the interests of morally evil persons.
Yet, there is something correct in Aquinas's conclusion insofar as, at least within the Christian tradition, the moral status of even egregiously evil persons is considered to be on a par with their innocent victims: Adolf Hitler is as much of a person as a Jewish internee at Auschwitz, hence why it constituted a moral dilemma for Christians whether it was licit to plot to assassinate Hitler (Riebling 2015) . Furthermore, Eleonore Stump (2010, 197-205) contends that even Satan, insofar as he is person created lovingly by God, continues to be loved by his Creator even though God knows that Satan's will is fixed and will never turn back towards loving union with Him.
Personhood is thus not earned through good moral acts, but rather is
given by one's very existence as a being of a rational nature. A question that arises at this point is whether the givenness of one's moral status as a person is due to having been created by a loving God-i.e., extrinsically grounded-or due to the inherent nature and concomitant traits one possesses as a person-i.e., intrinsically grounded. I see no reason why these should be mutually exclusive. For even non-theists typically acknowledge the intrinsic moral value of persons, however they may define such. Furthermore, Aquinas (1948, Ia, q. 118, a. 2 ad 5) notes that God cooperates with the process by means of which human persons are produced-by infusing a rational soul in any appropriately formed body-even if there is sin involved: e.g., a child conceived through an act of adultery. Today, it is evident that God cooperates with the creation of human persons in vitro and there is no reason to think God would not cooperate with the creation of a cloned human person, a chimera who bears the inherent traits of personhood, or-if possible-a truly artificially intelligent, self-aware, and autonomous machine, infusing such a creature with rational soul and thereby endowing it with a rational nature.
Our central concern regarding the creation of such entities should not only be whether we ought to create them in the first place, but the epistemic means we should adopt to determine whether they qualify as persons and how we ought to treat them in case of epistemic uncertainty. In this regard, the teaching of St. John Paul II (1995, n. 60 ) concerning the respect due to human embryos is instructive: "what is at stake is so important that, from the standpoint of moral obligation, the mere probability that a human person is involved would suffice to justify an absolutely clear prohibition of any intervention aimed at killing a human embryo." If it is licit to remove the qualifier "human" before "person," then the "mere probability" of being confronted with a person-whether human, non-human, chimeric, extraterrestrial, or perhaps even artificial-grounds a moral obligation to treat them with the same respect with which paradigmatic persons ought to be treated-a more expansive application of the Golden Rule or Kant's (1997, 38) second formulation of the Categorical Imperative.
Disputed Questions on Personhood
The previous analysis allows us now to weigh-in on a few disputed questions concerning the moral status of persons. First, is personhood inherent or imputed? According to Charles Taylor (1985, 97): Where it is more than simply a synonym for 'human being', 'person' figures primarily in moral and legal discourse. A person is a being with a certain moral status, or a bearer of rights. But underlying the moral status, as its condition, are certain capacities. A person is a being who has a sense of self, has a notion of the future and the past, can hold values, make choices; in short, can adopt life-plans. At least, a person must be the kind of being who is in principle capable of all this, however damaged these capacities may be in practice.
Daniel Dennett (1981, 270) contends to the contrary: [W] hether something counts as a person depends in some way on an attitude taken toward it, a stance adopted with respect to it … [I]t is not the case that once we have established the objective fact that something is a person, we treat him or her or it in a certain way, but that our treating him or her or it in this certain way is somehow and to some extent constitutive of its being a person. Second, is personhood a threshold concept, meaning one either is a person or is not, or is personhood a matter of degree, such that severely cognitively disabled human beings might not count as persons to the same extent as cognitively "normal" human beings? While any one of the traits that exemplify one's personhood may be actualized to various degrees-autonomy, for example, is expressed in relation to various potentially coercive influences in one's social milieu (Beauchamp and Childress 2013, 105 )-whether one has the inherent capacity for autonomy to any degree is a property one either possesses or does not. Self-consciousness would be another trait that appears to be an "all or nothing" affair. I am not talking here about the extent to which one is aware of the subconscious motivators of their behavior à la Freud, but self-consciousness in terms of being able to think substantive *I* thoughts. Baker (2000, 79) talks about Oedipus's self-mutilation as prompted, not by a third-personal assessment of the error of having killed one's own father and married one's mother, but the first-personal horror of having killed his own father and married his own mother. The capacity for such rich self-consciousness is either present or not.
Finally, is the value of one's personhood impersonally objective or subjectively indexed? Utilitarians, for example, hold that the value of a person's existence and interests is impersonally objective: to use Jeremy Bentham's famous dictum, each person in the utility calculus counts as one and no more than one. This allows for the interests of persons to be aggregated and for those of the majority to outweigh those of the minority. Kant also holds the value of personhood to be impersonally objective; but, in contrast to utilitarians, he assigns it an infinite value that does not allow for the respective value of individual persons to be weighed against one another. By contrast, an "interest-based" account of the value of personhood focuses on each individual's subjective valuing of their own interests-for life, pleasure, flourishing, truth, friendship, loving union with God, etc. There are various forms that an interest-based account may take and specific applications such an account might entail-e.g., allowing for a person rationally to elect suicide if they lose any subjective interest in their future life. A subjective interest account, though, is not inimical to the thesis that the very existence of a person is objectively valuable-in either the Kantian or utilitarian senses-and therefore ought to be subjectively appreciated by oneself; in fact, we typically view suicidal persons as suffering from clinical depression or some other cognitive/emotive defect that warrants amelioration by means other than suicide. In short, I contend that my life has objective value-in the
Kantian sense-because I am a person, but my value as a person should not be objectified-as utilitarianism allows-such that my life and interests may be weighed in a one-to-one scale with those of other persons; violations of my interests or the ultimate harm of death are also inextricably bad because of how they negatively impact me, subjectively, as a person. This is not to say that one's objective moral status as a person and the subjective value of one's interests are the only relevant factors in determining, for instance, whether it is justifiable to end someone's life-even Aquinas (1948, IIa-IIae, q. 64, a. 2) allows capital punishment to safeguard the body politic and the indirect killing of an aggressor in self-defense (Aquinas 1948, IIa-IIae, q. 64, a. 7) . They are, however, mutually indispensable factors in moral deliberation.
Conclusion -Post-Personhood?
To conclude, I would like to apply the analysis thus far to a relatively new point of debate among bioethicists: the possible advent of "post-persons" resulting from various forms of cognitive, emotive, and so-called "moral" enhancement. In brief, a post-person would putatively be someone-who either started out as a human being or is the offspring of already engineered post-persons-whose intellectual capacity, degree of emotional control, and, consequently, ability to consistently make virtuous moral choices would be an order of magnitude above our present collective capacities for such.
Nicholas Agar (2014, chs. 8-9) voices the concern that such entities may have morally superior needs to ours, akin to the morally superior needs we have in relation to non-human animals, which would justify the potential use of us mere persons by post-persons. It would thus not be in our collective self-interest to create such beings in the first place. The validity of Agar's concern may be seen in the Thomistic principle that the less perfect exists for the sake of the more perfect (Aquinas 1948, IIa-IIae, q. 64, a. 1) . This would not produce a race of post-persons whose moral status would be categorically different from our own, such that it would be morally incumbent upon unenhanced persons to yield the satisfaction of their own interests to post-persons. Buchanan's argument is based on personhood being a threshold concept, such that it would be a category mistake to believe we could create a race of post-persons who enjoy a higher moral status than we do. While Buchanan's concept of personhood, discussed below, is not Thomistic in its foundation, he and Aquinas share the view that personhood is a threshold concept: one is either a person or they are not. Aquinas would further contend that a being who is a person is so according to their essential rational nature; hence, one who is a person can only cease to be a person if they were to lose their essential nature, which would entail the end of one's existence altogether.
10 This leads us to the next question, which is whether there may be distinct kinds of rational natures, exhibiting differing degrees of rational potentiality, thereby allowing in principle the possible future existence of post-persons.
Buchanan and Agar both presume a Kantian definition of personhood in which the inherent moral status of persons is premised upon one's "capacity for practical rationality" (Agar 2014, 159) . While Buchanan holds that the presence of such a capacity marks one as a person-regardless of how well 10 Thomistic metaphysics would also entail that very concept of post-personhood is either incoherent or, if one could be enhanced to the point where they have taken on a new essential nature as a post-person, then they would no longer be the same individual being since no individual can survive a change in their specific nature. Thus, for instance, if it were both metaphysically and practically possible to upload a person's consciousness into some sort of cybernetic mainframe-a dream of at least some enhancement proponents known as "transhumanists"-the surviving consciousness would not constitute the numerically same person insofar as human persons are essentially rational animals and one's animality would be sacrificed in the uploading process; or alternatively, the uploaded consciousness would have to be encased within some sort of physical structure which provided similar sorts of sensory inputs that our biological bodies provide: the result might be understood as a rational animal-construct (Oderberg 2014, n. 45) . persons and non-persons and the inherent dignity of the former. Aquinas (1948, Ia, q. 59, a. 3) further allows for degrees of dignity among different genera of persons, reasoning that angels-who exist as pure intellects-possess free will "in a higher degree of perfection" than human beings do and thus "the angels' dignity surpasses" our own. Nevertheless, Aquinas does not claim that angels' greater dignity entails that their interests trump those of human persons the way Agar fears the interests of enhanced post-persons may override those of unenhanced human persons. Furthermore, the superior intellectual capacity, with concomitantly superior freedom of will, angels possess is due to their essentially immaterial nature. From a Thomistic perspective, the claim is doubtful that an enhanced human being, who remains essentially material in nature, could attain such an exponentially increased capacity for reasoning and free will that their inherent dignity would thereby be increased by an order of magnitude above that of other human persons.
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Even if it is arguable that the dignity of various types of persons may come in degrees, personhood remains yet a threshold concept, such that the basic natural interests-for life, freedom from pain, respect for individual autonomy, etc.-of even the lowliest persons ought not to be violated, even for the sake of promoting such interests for more dignified persons.
11 As Oderberg (2014, 224) contends, "…there is and can be nothing in between humans and angels. If there is an ontological hierarchy, as I believe, then from God we descend to spirits and then human beings. There is no space between the rational animals and the disembodied spirits, metaphysically speaking."
T H E O N TO LO G I CA L A N D M O RA L S I G N I F I CA N C E O F P E R S O N S
Although I do not share Agar's concern that radically enhanced post-persons could rightfully claim moral demands at the expense of the basic natural interests of unenhanced persons, the danger that such beings might not acknowledge the equivalent natural rights of the unenhanced has already been well-established by historical analogues in which certain groups of persons considered themselves to be more highly-evolved, and thereby more rightfully entitled, than other groups of persons.
Thomas Douglas (2013, 75) , however, contends, even if mere persons would be made worse off, overall, by the existence of post-persons, it might, nevertheless, be morally permissible to create post-persons ... This is because the creation of post-persons could be justified by considerations other than its consequences for mere persons. One possibility is that the creation of post-persons would be justified simply because the lives of post-persons would often be valuable in themselves. It is plausible that post-persons would be capable of enjoying extremely rich and fulfilling lives-perhaps lives much more fulfilling than any that a mere person could live-and we might have reasons to bring about such lives. In doing so, we would be adding something of value to the world.
This claim presumes that the value of persons is impersonally objective and thus comparatively evaluable. By contrast, killing someone is arguably objectively wrong, not because it removes something objectively valuable to the world, but because it removes something of incalculable value from the person themselves-viz., their life-which is the basis of their being able to experience a valuable future (Marquis 1989 
